Mood and Helping

MOOD AS A MOTIVATOR OF HELPING AND HELPING AS A REGULATOR OF MOOD

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This chapter describes the ways in which moods motivate helping and how helping subsequently serves to regulate moods. We first review the literature on how positive and negative moods motivate helping. We

AUTHORS' NOTE: We wish to thank Ellen S. Cohn, Paula M. Niedenthal, and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on early drafts of this manuscript. We are especially appreciative of Margaret S. Clark's careful and extensive editing on several versions of this chapter. Chloé Drake and Stephanie Fishkin provided assistance in the preparation of this chapter, and we are grateful for their help. Preparation was facilitated by the following grants to Peter Salovey, NIH BRSG S07 RR07105, NCI CA 42101, NCHS 200 88 7001, and an NSF Presidential Young Investigator Award; to John D. Mayer, NIH BRSG S07 RR07108 and NIMH MH44038; and to David L. Rosenhan, a grant from the Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Fund. Please address correspondence to Peter Salovey, Department of Psychology, Yale University, Box 11A Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520-7447.
next discuss the possible mechanisms by which moods exert their influence on helping and examine the evidence supporting those mechanisms. Then, we evaluate the proposition that helping influences mood by, for example, prolonging joy, preventing guilt, or relieving sorrow. Although this proposition seems almost self-evident, it has accrued mixed empirical support. We argue that such mixed support may result from an overly narrow conceptualization of emotional self-regulation rather than a flaw in the proposition itself. In part, experiments have only explored helping's short-term affective consequences. Although these short-term consequences are important, helping also has long-term affective ramifications that may transcend immediate mood repair or maintenance. Such long-term consequences may contribute to understanding why current moods may motivate helping. We conclude by speculating about the role that long-range affective regulation may play in understanding traditional “cold” motives for helping, in particular, social norms, and social learning.

MOOD-INDUCED HELPING

Much of the literature on mood and helping considers mood as an antecedent to helping. That is, the most common experiments manipulate mood as the independent variable and examine subjects’ behaviors in response to a helping opportunity. Experiments involving the laboratory induction of mood states followed by opportunities to help another person have been conducted for the better part of three decades. Systematic reviews of this literature can be found elsewhere (Carlson, Charlin, & Miller, 1988; Carlson & Miller, 1987; Rosenhan, Karylowski, Salovey, & Hargis, 1981; Salovey & Rosenhan, 1989; Schaller & Cialdini, 1990), so we will not attempt a detailed treatment of it here. Rather, in the following sections, we review the consistent trends in mood and helping. Then, relying heavily on two recent meta-analyses (Carlson, Charlin, & Miller, 1988; Carlson & Miller, 1987), we consider the mechanisms that are the likely mediators of mood-induced helping for the pleasant and unpleasant affects. In discussing these mechanisms, we focus particularly on two that involve the regulation of mood: the maintenance of pleasant moods and the repair of unpleasant moods.

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Essential Findings

The pleasant affects. The pleasant affect that has been studied most frequently in the helping area is happiness. And there is a joyful consistency to the findings. Happy moods, induced in a variety of ways, consistently motivate helping behaviors. The phenomenon has been called “the glow of good will” (Berkowitz & Connor, 1966), “the warm glow of success” (Isen, 1970), and “feel good, do good” (Rosenhan, Salovey, & Hargis, 1981). Positive feelings have been induced in a robust variety of ways: by having subjects succeed on, or receive bogus success feedback regarding, their performance on a laboratory task or game (e.g., Berkowitz & Connor, 1966; Isen, 1970; Isen, Horn, & Rosenhan, 1973; Weyant, 1978; Yelon & Bizman, 1980), think happy thoughts (e.g., Barden, Garber, Duncan, & Masters, 1981; Manucia, Baumann, & Cialdini, 1984; Moore, Underwood, & Rosenhan, 1973; O’Malley & Andrews, 1983; Rosenhan, Underwood, & Moore, 1974), find money or receive a gift (e.g., Cunningham, Steinberg, & Grev, 1980; Isen, Clark, & Schwartz, 1976; Isen & Levin, 1972), listen to pleasant music (e.g., Fried & Berkowitz, 1979), or simply experience sunny weather (e.g., Cunningham, 1979). In all of these studies, positive feelings motivated helping in a broad array of contexts that included picking up dropped books and papers, looking for contact lenses, contributing money, participating in another experiment, tutoring a needy student, and donating blood to the Red Cross.

There is, however, one interesting exception to these findings. Happy moods experienced empathically, rather than for self-relevant reasons, do not seem to engender helping. In laboratory experiments, when attention is focused upon the joyful experiences of others, either because the joy is attributed to the other’s good fortune (e.g., Rosenhan, Salovey, & Hargis, 1981) or because experimental procedures discourage self-attending (e.g., Berkowitz, 1987), helping is inhibited. Given the nature of the empathy, these findings are puzzling. They suggest that empathic good moods may be contaminated by envy (see Salovey & Rodin, 1984). We say more about the important role of attentional focus in mood-induced helping shortly.

The unpleasant affects. The negative moods studied most systematically as motivators of helping have been guilt and sorrow. Guilt was once thought to be the primary motivator of all altruistic behaviors (Freud, 1937; Glover, 1925). Psychoanalytic theorists argued that the
motive of relieving guilt was served by redirecting psychic energy to the needs of others. Empirical evidence is consistent with psychoanalytic theory and suggests that guilt expiation motivates helping. For example, individuals are more likely to donate money to charities prior to attending confession with a priest than afterward, when guilt has presumably been reduced (Harris, Benson, & Hall, 1975). Indeed, confessing transgressions, even outside of religious contexts, seems to reduce motivation to help others by diminishing the need to expiate (Regan, 1971).

In the absence of confession, transgression creates a strong motivation to help others. That motivation seems to be mediated by the arousal of guilt rather than shame (Dienstbier, Hillman, Hillman, Lehnhoff, & Valkenaar, 1975). The belief that one has transgressed is typically induced in the laboratory by making subjects feel responsible for breaking a piece of equipment (e.g., Cunningham, Steinberg, & Grev, 1980; D. Regan, Williams, & Sparling, 1972; Wallace & Sadalla, 1966), directly or indirectly causing harm to another person (e.g., Darlington & Macker, 1966; Harris & Samerotte, 1976; Rawlings, 1968) or an animal (e.g., J. Regan, 1971), or lying to another person (e.g., Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967; McMillen, 1970, 1971). When individuals believe they have transgressed, they are especially receptive to opportunities to help.

Even witnessing a person harm another can, at times, motivate helping (e.g., J. Regan, 1971). Individuals who have witnessed such transgressions but who have not transgressed themselves may experience guilt because they did not intercede on behalf of the victim. Alternatively, witnessing harm may lead to a generalized sense that the world is an unfair, harmful place, which, in turn, leads to sympathy for the victim and increased helping. Sympathy is a strong motivator of helping, as is clear in studies in which sympathy is encouraged by allowing subjects to observe the suffering of the victim (Konecni, 1972; J. Regan, 1971). Thus, when victims do not appear to suffer (or their suffering is hidden—perhaps by ghetto or concentration camp walls), helping is much less likely (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967; Milgram, 1974).

In contrast to guilt, sadness appears to exert very inconsistent effects on helping. Experiences that create sadness in the laboratory—task failure, bogus feedback, thinking sad thoughts—have, in different studies, motivated helping (e.g., Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; Donnerstein, Donnerstein, & Munger, 1975), inhibited helping (e.g., Moore, Underwood, & Rosenhan, 1973; Underwood, Froming, & Moore, 1977; Underwood et al., 1977), or not affected helping one way or the other (e.g., Harris & Siebal, 1975; Holloway, Tucker, & Hornstein, 1977; Isen, 1970; Rosenhan, Underwood, & Moore, 1974).

In a later section of this chapter, we will discuss some of the mechanisms that might help to explain when sadness promotes or inhibits helping. For now, we would simply note that, as was the case with positive feelings, attentional focus seems to mediate the effect of sadness on helping responses. Sadness that is focused on the self is much less likely to result in helping than is sadness focused on others (Carlson & Miller, 1987; Thompson, Cowan, & Rosenhan, 1980).

Accounting for Pleasant Mood—Helping Links

Although positive mood consistently promotes helping, there is some disagreement about the mechanism that underlies this relationship. Here we review some proposed mechanisms as well as the weight of empirical evidence in their favor.

Mood affects attentional focus and thoughts about the self. One explanation for the relationship between positive mood and helping arises from the fact that most positive mood states involve positive cognitions about the self. Thus the induction of a positive mood may often carry with it shifts in attention toward the self (Salovey, 1990; Salovey & Rodin, 1985). This increased self-attention may have three consequences. First, it may make salient one’s relatively advantageous resources and good fortune (Rosenhan, Salovey, & Hargis, 1981). This, in turn, may lead to a desire to help others who seem less fortunate. Second, individuals in such a self-focused state may also be more likely to conform to salient behavioral norms and ideals, if only to avoid the negative affective consequences that arise from failing to act on an obvious helping obligation (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Gibbons & Wicklund, 1982; Vallacher & Solodky, 1979; Wicklund, 1975). Finally, the self-focus itself may amplify the affective state (Scheier & Carver, 1977), thereby intensifying the first and second effects just noted.

The idea that self-focus may play an important mediating role in the effects of positive mood on helping is supported in a recent study by Berkowitz (1987). He found that adding a manipulation of self-focused attention to a mood induction enhanced the facilitative effect of positive moods on helping. Moreover, the results of a recent meta-analysis of the positive mood and helping literature (Carlson, Charlin, & Miller,
1988) showed that, when self-focused attention was heightened, the positive mood-helping link was reliably enhanced. In contrast, when the induced happiness arose from focusing on another’s good fortune, the link between positive moods and helping was attenuated, perhaps because such mood inductions recruit cognitions about one’s relative deficits, thereby creating feelings of deprivation, resentment, or envy (Rosenhan, Salovey, & Hargis, 1981).

Mood improves perceptions of situations and of others. Another explanation for the relationship between mood and helping has been termed the concomitance hypothesis (Cialdini, Kenrick, & Baumann, 1982; Manucia, Baumann, & Cialdini, 1984). This hypothesis holds that happy people help more than others because good moods produce helping-relevant thoughts that motivate helping independent of the mood itself. Thus the effect of mood on helping is indirect. Positive moods increase liking toward others because happy individuals generate more positive evaluations of others than do sad individuals (Forgas & Bower, 1987; Gouaux, 1971; Griffitt, 1970; Mayer, Mamberg, & Volanthe, 1988; Mayer & Volanthe, 1985; Veitch & Griffitt, 1976). In addition, people in positive moods tend to see the positive side of social interactions (Forgas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984). Given that one likes another more and sees the positive side of interactions with the other, one is more likely to offer help.

Second, and closely related to the first point, positive moods may cue positive aspects of the helping situation itself (Clark & Waddell, 1983). For instance, people who are in a good mood may expect that their helpfulness will evoke gratitude and appreciation. Therefore, they are more likely to help.

Finally, positive moods may facilitate thoughts about the positive aspects of one’s social community and of human nature more generally. In fact, some investigators contend that, even in the absence of mood changes, positive events produce help-engendering cognitions (Holloway, Tucker, & Hornstein, 1977; Hornstein, LaKind, Frankel, & Manne, 1975). Supporting this idea is the evidence that changes in social outlook (that may or may not be instigated by mood changes) were reliably associated with helping in the Carlson, Charlin, and Miller (1988) meta-analysis.

Mood maintenance. Still another explanation for the link between positive mood and helping is that people may help in order to maintain their positive moods. The mood maintenance hypothesis states that pleasant moods can be best maintained by making responses, including altruistic responses, that foster further pleasant feelings (Clark & Isen, 1982; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Isen & Simmonds, 1978). In short, helping prolongs positive moods. Evidence supporting this idea comes from several sources. In two field experiments, Harris (1977) found that some forms of interpersonal helping lead to mood improvement. In another study, high school students who accepted the opportunity to help by participating in an experiment felt better than those who did not (Yinon & Landau, 1987). Helping led to enhanced mood in three studies reported by Williamson and Clark (1989), especially if the helper desired a communal relationship with the help seeker. Finally, giving advice improved the mood of advice givers in a study by Mayer, Gottlieb, Hernandez, Smith, and Gordis (1990).

Helping, however, does not invariably produce good feelings. Helpers burdened by helping tasks that are chronic and unchanging, such as caring for a family member with Alzheimer’s disease, may be at risk for depression (Maslach, 1982). Also, helping those who do not seem to deserve help (such as panhandlers) may not lead to improvement in mood (Harris, 1977). We will confine our discussion, however, to those situations in which helping is likely to be experienced positively.

In addition to showing that helping improves moods, two other types of support for the mood maintenance hypothesis are found in the literature. First, some have argued that, if the mood maintenance explanation is correct, then happy people should prefer helping opportunities that are comparatively pleasant and not stressful. Support for this deduction seems rather consistent. Happy subjects who believe their moods might deteriorate through helping are less willing to offer help (Forest, Clark, Mills, & Isen, 1979; Harada, 1983; Isen & Levin, 1972; Isen & Simmonds, 1978; Shaffer & Graziano, 1983).

Second, the Carlson, Charlin, and Miller (1988) meta-analysis confirmed two predictions that support the mood maintenance hypothesis. The first prediction was that, because pleasant tasks enable better maintenance of pleasant moods, the overall pleasantness of the helping task should correlate positively with the obtained effect size. The second prediction was that intermediate levels of positive affect should lead to more helping than either very low or high levels of positive affect. The rationale for this prediction is that individuals at intermediate levels have a greater opportunity to maintain their moods than those who are either so happy they do not need to or so miserable that improvement would be difficult. Both hypotheses were supported. A correlation of .34 was obtained between the pleasantness of the helping
task and the degree to which positive mood motivated helping, while a correlation of .38 was found between moderate degrees of pleasantness and helping (reported as a lack of deviation of mood from an average value).

**Accounting for Unpleasant Mood—Helping Links**

The influence of negative moods on helping is more complex than that for positive moods. Guilt generally facilitates helping behavior, but sorrow evokes mixed results. Three mechanisms have been posited to explain the pattern of results obtained in the negative mood literature. First, sadness may influence attentional focus, which, in turn, may influence helping. Second, negative mood manipulations may influence felt responsibility to help. And, finally, helping may serve to relieve all negative states because helping makes one feel good (Carlson & Miller, 1987).

*Mood influences the content of thoughts and attentional focus.* Sadness may influence helping by increasing the salience of negative thoughts while simultaneously influencing focus of attention. If sadness is induced in a self-relevant way, such as recalling the sad events of the past, attention may well drift to other mood-congruent thoughts. Thoughts of deprivation, helplessness, and uselessness may become especially available, rendering such sad and self-focused individuals less likely to help because they are preoccupied with self and/or with perceptions that they are disadvantaged compared with others. Supporting this idea is evidence that the self-preoccupation of sad individuals (see, for example, Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Wood, Saltzberg & Goldsamt, 1990) retards helping unless the request for help is made extremely salient and cannot be ignored (Mayer, Duval, Holtz, & Bowman, 1985; McMillen, Sanders, & Solomon, 1977; but see Wegner & Schaefer, 1978). In contrast, sad individuals become more helpful if their sadness is felt in conjunction with attention directed externally to the plight of others. In an experiment in which subjects experienced sadness by hearing a description of a friend dying from cancer, helping increased if subjects attended to the pain and suffering of their dying friend but decreased if they thought about their own feelings of loss (Thompson, Cowan, & Rosenhan, 1980; see also Barnett, King, & Howard, 1979; Kidd & Marshall, 1982).

There has been some confusion in the literature between self versus other and internal versus external foci of attention (Carlson & Miller, 1987). Although these two dimensions seem conceptually similar, they are not. One can attend to one's own thoughts (internally focused) regarding another (other focused). In the cancer study described above, for example, self versus other focus, not internally versus externally directed attention, was manipulated. The Carlson and Miller (1987) meta-analysis suggested that the self/other distinction is critical: The partial correlation between concern for another person and helping after negative mood induction was .30. On the other hand, internal versus external focus was unrelated to altruism following negative mood induction.

*Felt responsibility.* Still another explanation for observed links between negative moods and helping has to do with the way in which certain negative moods, guilt in particular, influence a person's felt responsibility for aiding another. Guilt is increased when one feels responsible for the welfare of someone else who is suffering. Thus, when a child entrusted to your care becomes ill, you help. When such felt responsibility is minimized by preoccupation with one's own negative feelings, helping is inhibited, especially when requests for help are not salient or legitimate (Aderman & Berkowitz, 1983; Gibbons & Wicklund, 1982; Rogers, Miller, Mayer, & Duval, 1982).

*Negative-state relief.* Individuals who wish to terminate their negative mood may be helpful to others as a way of repairing their bad mood. Helping, in this sense, is an instrumental motive in the service of improving mood (Manucia, Baumann, & Cialdini, 1984). This is the so-called negative-state relief account of altruistic behavior. Cialdini and his colleagues (e.g., Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976; Schaller & Cialdini, 1990) have proposed that individuals are motivated to relieve negative feeling states and use helping as a strategy to this end. This view is based on the idea that helping serves a self-reinforcing function (Weiss, Boyer, Lombardo, & Stitch, 1973; Weiss, Buchanan, Alstatt, & Lombardo, 1971) and that helping and self-gratification are functionally equivalent as a means of alleviating sad moods (Baumann, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 1981).

The primary evidence for mood repair as the motivator of helping comes from studies in which sadness is induced and avenues other than the helping opportunity to improve mood are made available. For example, if subjects are rewarded following negative mood induction but before they have an opportunity to help, they are no more likely to help than neutral mood control subjects (Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; Cunningham, Steinberg, & Grev, 1980). Moreover, if subjects
do not believe their moods can be improved by helping, they do not help following negative mood induction (Manucia, Baumann, & Cialdini, 1984).

The literature on guilt as a motivator for helping is also taken as evidence for negative-state relief. Guilty individuals help rather consistently. For instance, shoppers in a mall were asked to take a photo of an experimental confederate. Those in the guilt condition who were made to feel as if they had broken the camera were later more willing than the controls to help a second shopper (actually, a second confederate) who lost candy through the torn corner of her shopping bag (D. Regan, Williams, & Sparling, 1972). These studies indicated that guilty individuals attempt to repair their guilt through helping others. (The positive findings concerning the repair of guilt, however, did not clearly generalize to relieving other negative moods.)

We should mention as well that theory and findings discussed earlier in the section on positive mood maintenance and helping are just as relevant to the negative-state relief hypothesis. The positive mood enhancement generated by helping in studies by Harris (1977), Yinon and Landau (1987), Williamson and Clark (1989), and Mayer, Gottlieb, Hernandez, Smith, and Gordis (1990) could be also expected to relieve the mood of sad subjects.

Nevertheless, the findings regarding the negative-state relief hypothesis are by no means uniformly supportive. Carlson and Miller's (1987) meta-analysis tested three hypotheses regarding negative-state relief. First, they suggested that, because socialization leads to greater recognition of how helping others results in feeling better, subject age should correlate with effect size. Second, the sadder or more depressed the initial mood (as generated by a given negative mood induction), the more helping should be motivated. Third, the distastefulness of helping should correlate negatively with the effect size on the grounds that distasteful (e.g., effortful, costly) helping should be less apt to improve one's mood.

Carlson and Miller found no support for any of the three hypotheses. The relation between sadness and helping was nonsignificant \( r = .08 \), as was that for age \( r = -.13 \). Distastefulness of the helping task was significant in the wrong direction \( r = .33 \), suggesting that greater unpleasantness might lead to greater feelings of virtue. It is interesting that guilt did predict effect size, correlating significantly and highly \( r = .50 \) with helping behavior. The authors concluded that negative-state relief is inadequate to explain the increased helping behavior of saddened subjects, but they suggested an exception be made specifically for guilt.

Although the Carlson and Miller (1987) meta-analysis did not provide much evidence for the negative-state relief model of helping (but see Cialdini & Fultz, 1990; Miller & Carlson, 1990), some promising findings have been reported in the subsequent literature (Batson et al., 1989; Cialdini et al., 1987; Schaller & Cialdini, 1988). Schaller and Cialdini (1988), for example, found that altruistic behavior on the part of sad subjects declined if alternative cheering-up situations, such as exposure to humorous, mood-enhancing information, were available as alternatives to helping. On the other hand, the evidence for negative-state relief provided by the Manucia, Baumann, and Cialdini (1984) study was not replicated in a recent experiment by Schroeder, Dovidio, Sibicky, Mathews, and Allen (1988), who found beliefs about the lability of one's mood did not mediate the relationship between the arousal of empathy and helping.

MOOD REGULATION AND ALTRUISM

A Long-Term Perspective

We have examined the ways in which moods influence helping, and now we wish to shift gears a bit and look at the connections between mood and helping from a broader perspective. When we discussed mood maintenance explanations for the impact of positive moods on helping and mood repair explanations for some of the impact of negative moods on helping, we already touched on how helping may influence moods. That is, people may often help in order to maintain their immediate positive moods, and they may also help in order to alleviate their immediate negative states (or, at least, their guilt). But is that the end of the story of links between helping and mood? We think not. We believe the impact of helping on moods goes further. Despite the Carlson and Miller (1987) failure to find support for a mood repair explanation of the relationship between negative mood and helping, we are not quite ready to give up on the idea that helping may serve to regulate moods (and neither are Cialdini & Fultz, 1990). In particular, in this section, we wish to argue, first, that people may help in order to regulate their moods over quite long periods of time (in addition to the immediate boost in moods helping may provide) and, second, that this
is possible because humans may be unique in their ability to see the possibility of strategically delaying short-term pleasure for greater long-term good and, in fact, often do so.

By long-term regulation, we mean habitual ways of organizing life’s experiences such that long-term outcomes generate satisfaction and positive feeling. People have many goals in their lives, some of which are long term and unfold over time (e.g., seeing one’s children grow to be responsible, independent citizens). These goals can often be met by helping others. We may help others in order to obtain these long-term goals (and their associated satisfactions) even when the short-term consequences may be quite negative. Indeed, one of the paradoxes of altruism—that it seems to be a behavior that is persistent, on one hand, but is often unpleasant and unrewarded, on the other (Rosenhan, 1978)—is resolved in this analysis. Christians who rescued Jews from the Nazis probably experienced little immediate pleasure and may well have suffered considerable costs and negative affect (London, 1970; Stein, 1988). Nonetheless, by providing haven for Jews, they also achieved a longer-term goal of being able to reflect on their actions later with great satisfaction. Oliner and Oliner (1988), in this regard, conducted intensive interviews with rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe. The reflections of these rescuers, subject to all of the biases of retrospectivity, suggest that altruistic behaviors do have long-term affective influences with consequences that often extend even beyond the helper. Indeed, one daughter said of her mother, “It is so important to know that people like my mother, who did not blow up trains or shoot people in the dark, did what she was really cut out to do—to sustain life rather than destroy it. People like her have made such a difference in the world” (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p. 230).

The kind of altruism of which we write need not be so dramatic as rescue behavior. Consider a more commonplace example: a mother’s willingness to allow herself to be interrupted from a pleasurable task to help her daughter and contribute to the child’s long-term well-being. The immediate consequence to the mother might well be aversive, but, later, the child’s superior self-confidence might reward the mother in many ways. Even current annoyance might be tempered by the positive feelings arising from anticipated future pleasures associated with having met the altruistic goals. Thus helping immediately may serve a long-term mood-regulatory function.

Much as long-term goals can be facilitated by helping, they can be harmed by not helping. Parents who fail to help their children at crucial times, for example, may not experience negative consequences immediately but may well experience negative consequences in the long run (e.g., by raising a child who cares little about them). Helpers often anticipate such consequences. They know that, if they do not help, they will feel bad in the present and, perhaps, even worse in the future.

Thus, when we talk about helping as a form of mood regulation, we take a broader perspective than has been done in the past. Such a long-term perspective seems to clarify some of the initial perplexing findings that are already available in the literature. Consider, for instance, the prediction of Carlson and Miller (1987) that more helping will occur when the helping task is positive, presumably because distasteful helping should be less apt to improve one’s mood. This prediction did not receive support in their meta-analysis. But the prediction makes sense only if one considers the immediate, salient consequences of helping. What if one thinks about the helper’s long-term goals? If one’s long-term goal is to be a person who lives up to one’s moral standards, and if striving toward that goal brings pleasure, then helping in a distasteful task may well be more reinforcing than helping in a pleasant one. After all, if one does something especially risky or costly such as saving Jews from Nazis, then one can find consolation in being an especially good person.

The reason that helping serves a long-term mood-regulatory function is that people think strategically about the future. But do people necessarily think about the positive impact of helping on long-term happiness each and every time they help? They may, which may motivate some acts of helping. And, they may not. They may simply help to facilitate a long-term goal, without thinking about the consequences for mood. Or they may simply help out of habit. But, in all three cases, helping will have positive implications for their current and future moods because a long-term goal was facilitated.

The Strategic Regulation of Mood

There is little research on the ways in which helping serves longer-term goals. But it may be useful to examine a related literature for clues about the direction of future research. This literature concerns the ways in which individuals think about and attempt to regulate their ongoing mood states.
There is a set of secondary, reflective experiences of mood, called *meta-experiences of mood*, that regulate mood by monitoring, evaluating, and often changing it (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). For example, some people think positive thoughts to alleviate a bad mood or remind themselves of reality to bring down a mood that is too happy or out of control. Thinking positive thoughts or reminding oneself of reality are meta-experiences of mood whose central function is regulatory.

Individuals often regulate mood through plans and associated actions that are quite deliberate and involved. For example, mood can be regulated by choosing the people with whom we associate or situations we enter. If we would like to experience pride, we can invite a famous (but not too similar) friend for dinner, or we can leaf through the photograph album of our daughter’s bat mitzvah (Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988). We are often motivated to seek information that maintains a positive view of ourselves (Tesser, 1986, 1988). Moreover, when individuals help others, their moods improve (Harris, 1977; Mayer, Gottlieb, Hernandez, Smith, & Gordes, 1990). For example, Mayer, Gottlieb, Hernandez, Smith, and Gordes (1990) randomly assigned the role of advice giver and advice seeker to undergraduates. Those who gave advice showed improvements in mood.

In previous work (Mayer, DiPaolo, & Salovey, 1990; Salovey & Mayer, 1990), we identified a set of skills concerning the appropriate recognition of emotions in the self and others and the use of emotional information to solve problems and motivate behavior. We label these skills *emotional intelligence*. One aspect of emotional intelligence is the recognition, first, that one can regulate mood by behaving in certain ways and, second, that behavior may have long-term as well as short-term affective consequences. Future research may discover that the tendencies to self-regulate moods and to think about long-term affective consequences arise from reliable individual differences. The identification of individuals with such skills may help to clarify the mixed support that, for example, the negative-state relief model of helping has received.

**EMOTIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN TRADITIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR HELPING BEHAVIOR**

In this discussion of moods as motivators for helping behavior and the role of helping behavior in mood regulation, the traditional social psychological explanations for helping behavior—social learning and adherence to norms—have been conspicuously absent. The reason is that such social psychological explanations have not employed affect as a significant determinant. In this final section, we suggest that affective processes can be integrated into traditional explanations for helping. Little data supporting such an integration exist yet. Nevertheless, these ideas are offered as suggestions for further work.

**Social Learning**

Social learning theories explain helping and altruism in terms of personal assessment of the likely consequences of the behavior and one’s capacities to carry out the required actions. For instance, individuals evaluate the costs associated with helping versus not helping in any situation (Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981; Piliavin, Piliavin, & Rodin, 1975). Observation of the helpfulness of others also motivates the individual to offer help. Models can make helping salient, demonstrate what appropriate helping would be, and increase self-efficacy on the part of would-be helpers (Bandura, 1973; Krebs, 1970; Latané & Darley, 1970; Rosenhan & White, 1967). Reinforcement history associated with prior helping acts may also motivate subsequent helping. Individuals who have experienced the gratitude of previous recipients of their help may be more likely to seek such gratitude in the future (Moss & Page, 1972).

Although social learning formulations have not emphasized emotional processes as motivators of helping, recent research suggests that perceptions of helping efficacy, for example, may be profoundly influenced by mood. Salovey (1987-1988) constructed a helping self-efficacy scale and asked subjects to indicate their confidence in their ability to carry out required helping behaviors in 20 different situations (such as helping a roommate with homework for several hours, calling the police after hearing a scream, or donating money to the annual office charity drive). Helping self-efficacy was very mood sensitive. After a laboratory mood induction procedure, happy subjects viewed themselves as much more capable of performing helping acts than control subjects. And helping self-efficacy scores were lowest among sad subjects.

Affect is implicated in other social learning explanations for helping. The idea that helping can be used to regulate mood, and especially to relieve negative states, is probably learned both vicariously (by
watching significant others become happier after helping) and through repeated, positively reinforced experiences (see Weiss, Buchanan, Alstatt, & Lombardo, 1971). Consistent with this view are findings that older children who had the benefit of social learning experiences are more likely to help following negative moods than younger children (Cialdini, Baumann, & Kenrick, 1981; Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976; Kenrick, Baumann, & Cialdini, 1979).

Societal Norms

Another traditional explanation for helping and altruism concerns the internalization of various helping norms. One such norm is reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), the idea that giving help involves a quid pro quo, an equitable exchange of resources. Another is social responsibility, a helping norm that refers to an obligation or civic duty to help others in certain situations (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963; Schwartz, 1977). The selflessness norm refers to the performance of charitable acts with no expectation of extrinsic gain.

Norm-based explanations for helping behavior have not generally included affect as a motivator. Yet, affect may be implicated in the operation of helping norms in two ways. First, different emotions may facilitate the accessibility of different helping norms, and, second, conformity to helping norms may help to regulate mood. By presenting subjects with descriptions of helping acts and then asking them to generate the reasons for helping in each situation, we ascertained that happiness, for example, increased the saliency of norms concerning selflessness and charity, decreased the saliency of reciprocity motives, and had no influence at all on social responsibility (Salovey, 1987-1988).

Moreover, individuals may conform to helping norms to regulate their emotions. Selflessness-inspired helping may elicit or maintain great joy and relieve guilt. Not adhering to norms of social responsibility can produce shame; pride emanates from doing one’s civic duty. When reciprocity is operating, individuals may feel confident and capable and, when it breaks down, helpless. Furthermore, a strong belief in a just and cooperative world that is maintained by doing good works may be an excellent way to strategically maximize one’s positive mood.

CONCLUSION

In reviewing the literature on the mood-helping relationship, it is important that attention be directed to the regulatory mechanisms that maintain pleasant moods and relieve unpleasant ones. It is clear that individuals may use helping opportunities to regulate their moods over the long term. Long-term regulation looks to maximize pleasure globally over time. An examination of the time frames for mood regulation may enrich theoretical work on the affective consequences of helping and clarify conflicting findings about its importance. Finally, affective processes may well be hidden in traditional social psychological explanations. These processes remain to be explicated.

REFERENCES


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