Emotional Intelligence as a Standard Intelligence

John D. Mayer
University of New Hampshire

David R. Caruso
Work-Life Strategies

Peter Salovey
Yale University

Gill Stajer-Neis
Multi-Health Systems, Inc.

The authors have claimed that emotional intelligence (EI) meets traditional standards for an intelligence (J. D. Mayer, D. R. Caruso, & P. Salovey, 1999). R. D. Roberts, M. Zeidner, and G. Mathews (2003) questioned whether that claim was warranted. The central issue raised by Roberts et al. concerning Mayer et al. (1999) is whether there are correct answers to questions on tests purporting to measure EI as a set of abilities. To address this issue (and others), the present authors briefly restate their view of intelligence, emotion, and EI. They then present arguments for the reasonableness of measuring EI as an ability, indicate that correct answers exist, and summarize recent data suggesting that such measures are, indeed, reliable.

In 1999, we published “Emotional Intelligence Meets Traditional Standards for an Intelligence” in the journal Intelligence (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999). In that article, we presented a new scale of emotional intelligence (EI), the Multi-Factor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS; Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999) that was based on a decade of theoretical and empirical work. We argued, on the basis of the MEIS and findings with it, that EI was a lot like a traditional intelligence. First, it could be measured as an ability for which there were correct answers. Second, the domain of EI was sizeable in that we could come up with 12 fairly diverse tasks to measure it—everything from recognizing emotion in faces to understanding how emotions are likely to change over time. Third, after administering the test to 503 adults and 239 adolescents, we found that those 12 diverse tasks were positively correlated. A factor analysis of those tasks indicated that they could be defined by one general factor and that they also fell into three or four subgroups of skills roughly corresponding to our model of EI (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Finally, EI ability increased with age, at least across the age ranges that we explored in cross-sectional studies. Roberts, Zeidner, and Matthews (2000) have questioned what kind of an intelligence EI may be—if it is an intelligence at all. One should start with the fact that there is a great deal of agreement between their findings and our own. In their words (pp. 223-224):

Some features of the psychometric analyses support Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey’s (1999) claim that EI meets criteria for an intelligence. We replicated the finding of a positive manifold between subfactors of the MEIS, and, generally, the pattern of correlations corresponded well to the Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey (1999) findings. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses showed broad similarities with Mayer et al.’s factor solutions, although there were some differences in detail, and, in exploratory analyses, subscale communities were often low. In fact, the confirmatory analyses tend to support Mayer et al.’s initial conception of four branches of EI, rather than the three-factor model that has subsequently been derived.

In fact, the MEIS represented a great step forward for us in relation to our earlier ability scales (e.g., Mayer, DiPaolo, & Salovey, 1990; Mayer & Geber, 1996). The MEIS included many tasks that Roberts et al. (2001) and we, found intercorrelated well. The overall Cronbach’s alpha of the factor-based scale
representing the entire test was .96 (Mayer et al., 1999, p. 286). Also, one of the great advances of the MEIS over our earlier, more limited ability measures, was the first attempt to introduce an "expert" criterion for deciding on a correct answer, although at the time, we only had two such experts. In earlier studies, we relied on general consensus scoring; basically, the de-

gree to which the individual agreed with the response of the general group was the index of correctness. In expert scoring, two of the authors provided their own estimation of the optimal answers to the test. (We also examined a target form of scoring in which, e.g., a person whose face was being examined with regard to the emotions it expressed, reported how she or he felt.)

Still, in reviewing the psychometrics of the MEIS, Roberts et al. (2001) found much to be concerned about. Again, in their words (p. 224):

... other aspects of the data render many of the EI con-
cepts more problematic than is acceptable for ability mea-
sures... In particular, the reliability of subsets that form the highest branches of the model, and are thus probably the most important components of the MEIS for prediction of real-world social behaviors (e.g., pro-
gressions, managing others), is among the poorest in this battery. In addition intercorrelations between subsets, although resulting in positive manifold, are notably lower than is common in research involving ability mea-
sures (compare, for example, data presented here with various data sets presented in Carroll, 1993). Further, various factor analyses indicate a structure that is rela-
tively unstable, certainly when compared with similar analyses that have been conducted with intelligence and personality measures.

Perhaps the most severe psychometric difficulty is the lack of convergence between expert- and consensus-
scored dimensions. There are instances of agreement, especially for the Blends and Prognosis tests, but in general, cross-correlations are too small to suggest con-
vergence. The correlation between the general factors extracted from each of the two data sets was only .26.

Their findings led them to several conceptual points of importance, raised mostly in their discussion. Rob-
erts et al. (2001) concluded that there may be no ob-
jective answers to EI tests, and because correct an-
swers are scored on the basis of group consensus, EI does not qualify as an intelligence. Perhaps, the au-
thors suggest, EI actually measures some form of com-
formity in relation to the group. As previously noted, they were also concerned about the reliability of such scales. We first briefly restate our view of EI. Then, we address Roberts et al.'s concerns by considering the following: (a) Are there really correct answers on tests of EI? (b) If, as we argue, consensus scoring is

ideal, is EI merely a measure of conventionality? (c) Finally, are the tests reliable, and if not, can they be made to be reliable? We continue to assert that EI is, indeed, a traditional intelligence. Some of our argu-
ments are theoretical; others rely on further findings from new studies we have conducted (Mayer, Sa-
lovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2001).

An Overview of the Concept of EI

The Nature of Intelligence

Synopsis on intelligence over the years have re-
peatedly concluded that the first hallmark of intelli-
gence is abstract reasoning (Sternberg, 1997). That is, intelligence involves such capacities as seeing the similarities and differences among objects, being able to analyze parts and appreciate their relation to each other and as a whole, and generally, being able to reason validly within and across content domains. Ab-
stract reasoning, although the core aspect, is assisted by several other functions. Several such adjacent areas are of relevance here: input, knowledge base, and meta-strategies (for a more detailed view, see Mayer & Mitchell, 1998). These are enumerated in Table 1.

First, abstract reasoning cannot take place without an input function. Different intelligence are often de-
fined according to what is input and processed. For example, verbal intelligence pertains to reasoning about language; spatial intelligence pertains to reason-
ing about the position and movement of objects in space. Whatever the area, something must get the in-
formation—be it verbal, spatial, or emotional—into the system. Second, abstract reasoning is assisted by a well-organized, related body of knowledge: the knowlege base. This was what Cattell originally re-
ferred to as crystallized intelligence (Ackerman, 1997; Cattell, 1945). Third, there are meta-
cognitions—basically, strategies for operating with an intelligence in the context of broader mental life. A meta-cognition may be that it helps, in analyzing a problem, to write down portions of the problem so that not everything needs to be kept in short-term memory.

The Nature of Emotion and Emotional Information

There is considerable diversity of opinion as to what emotion is (Frijda, 2000; Solomon, 2000). A reasonable definition, however, might be that an emotion is an organized mental response to an event that includes physiological, experiential, and
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<tr>
<th>Aspect of emotions</th>
<th>Examples from emotional intelligence</th>
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<tr>
<td>Meta-processing (adjunct)</td>
<td>Knowing that helping someone may be meaningful</td>
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<td>Knowing that helping someone may be meaningful</td>
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<td>Abstract understanding and reasoning (adjunct)</td>
<td>Being able to analyze an emotion and identify its parts and how they combine</td>
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<td>Having knowledge (and remembering analyses) of prior instances of stories</td>
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<td>Knowledge base processing (adjunct)</td>
<td>Being able to keep long sentences in memory</td>
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<td>Being able to keep long sentences in memory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Input processing (adjunct)</td>
<td>Being able to perceive emotions in others</td>
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<td>Note. This summary overview follows Mayer &amp; Mitchell, 1998, Table 1.</td>
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cognitive aspects, among others. Of particular importance to us is that emotions typically occur in the context of relationships (cf. Lazarus, 1991). One is angry if blocked from attaining a goal, happy if loved by someone who one loves in return, afraid when threatened, and the like. These relationships may be entirely internal, as when one is afraid of what one might do, or external, as when one envisions another person. If emotions often arise in relationships, then emotional information is information about certain forms of these relationships.

One critical aspect of emotional information, is its consistency across people. Compelling cross-cultural research by Ekman (1997) has supported Darwin's hypothesis that emotional expression has evolved across species (Darwin, 1872/1965). This strongly implies that emotional information—and the capacity to read it—would show some universality across human beings and even closely related mammalian species.Ekman argued that recognition of facial emotional expression was universal. Any apparent differences in human emotional expression from culture to culture could be attributed to the fact that different societies teach different display rules about appropriate moments to express certain feelings. Additional evidence for the regularity of emotional information can be found in the area of artificial intelligence, where cognitive scientists created expert systems that could understand emotions in rudimentary stories (Dyer, 1983). We deal with the nature of emotional information in greater detail below, as we discuss the issue of the "correct answer" to an EI test item.

The Nature of EI

Our model of EI begins with the idea that emotions contain information about relationships. (Other models of EI exist as well; see Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000b, for a review.) When a person's relationship with another person or an object changes, so do their emotions toward that person or object. A person who is viewed as threatening is feared, an object that is favored is liked. Whether these relationships are actual, remembered, or even imagined, they are accompanied by the felt signals called emotions. EI, in turn, refers to an ability to recognize the meanings of emotions and their relationships and to use them as a basis in reasoning and problem solving. It further involves using emotions to enhance cognitive activities (Mayer et al., 1999).

Our own analysis of emotion-related abilities led us to divide EI into four areas of skills (e.g., Mayer & Salovey, 1995, 1997; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). We call these areas branches in reference to the diagrams in which they were first introduced. The four-branch model that we now use divides EI into four areas: accuracy in (a) perceiving emotions, (b) using emotions to facilitate thought, (c) understanding emotions, and (d) managing emotions in a way that enhances personal growth and social relations. We view a distinction between the second branch (using emotions to facilitate thought) and the other three. Branches 1, 3, and 4 involve reasoning about emotions. Branch 2 uniquely involves using emotions to enhance reasoning. Finally, we view the four branches as forming a hierarchy, with emotional perception at the bottom and management at the top. This four-branch model serves as a basis of our current reviews of the field (e.g., Mayer, 2001; Salovey, Bedell, Mayer, & Denzler, 2000; Salovey, Mayer, & Caruso, in press; Salovey, Wooten, & Mayer, 2001).

With this thumbnail sketch of our model, let us proceed to Roberts et al.'s (2001) concerns.
Which Areas of EI Should Correlate Highest With Cognitive Intelligence?

A clarification of one aspect of our EI model can explain a result obtained by Roberts et al. (2001) that they found to be unexpected. Recall that our four-branch model of EI is hierarchical in the context of an individual’s personality. The four branches are briefly described in Table 2. There, emotional understanding is most allied with cognitive processing and abstract reasoning; it is most cognitively saturated. Emotion management, although the highest branch, creates an interface between the cognitive system and the more general personality system. As such, emotion management is actually less cognitive than emotional understanding, because it must balance many factors including the motivational, emotional, and cognitive (Mayer, 2001). Roberts et al. expected the MEIS’s emotion management to be the highest correlation with general IQ, because it should be “most cognitive.” In fact, however, our model supposes that the third branch, understanding, is most cognitive and should have the highest relation to abstract reasoning. That, in fact, is what the data show; the third branch does correlate most highly with IQ.

Are There Correct Answers to Our EI Tests?

Roberts et al. (2001) identified “the most severe psychometric difficulty” with our work to be “the lack of convergence between expert- and consensus-scored dimensions” (p. 234). Let us begin in earnest with this issue for two reasons. First, it is primary to whether there can be a correct answer to a test of EI, and hence, whether EI is a standard intelligence. Second, it is by their own description, their most important criticism. As their concern began with the empirical finding that consensus and expert data correlated only r = .26 (p. 234) in their sample, let us start with the empirical issue. Roberts et al. noted, “The discrepancies are sufficiently large that they imply that one or the other scoring method should be discarded, in fact it is hard to envisage modifications that would bring factors that are correlated at less than .50 into alignment” (p. 226).

**Empirical Concerns**

Roberts et al.’s (2001) findings suggested the unlikelihood of any eventual convergence between scoring methods. At the same time, the MEIS was an experimental measure, a first attempt to operationalize our full model of EI. The addition of rudimentary expert scoring was intended as an exploration of the possibility of another criterion of correctness and was not intended as a final expert criterion. We recognized that two authors answering a long test would be unlikely to create the most optimal version of the expert criterion possible. Indeed, Legre (1995) pointed out that individual experts are typically unreliable. His own research indicated that as expert weight aggregated they might be expected to approach for general consensus in this domain. At the time our first article on the MEIS appeared, we were that expert scoring and consensus scoring converged to some degree and that because the expert-given consensus appeared more reliable, and yielded better test-factor structure, it should be used (Mayer et al., 1999, pp. 283–284).

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<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Description of measure</th>
<th>Relation to intelligence and personality</th>
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<tr>
<td>1: Perceiving emotion</td>
<td>Ability to identify emotions in faces, pictures</td>
<td>Interface with personality and personal goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Facilitating taught with emotion</td>
<td>Ability to harness emotional information and directionality to enhance thinking</td>
<td>Calibrates and adjusts thinking so that cognitive tasks make use of emotional information</td>
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<tr>
<td>3: Understanding emotion</td>
<td>Ability to comprehend emotional information about relationships, transitions from one emotion to another, linguistic information about emotions</td>
<td>Central locus of abstract processing and reasoning about emotions and emotional information</td>
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<tr>
<td>4: Managing emotion</td>
<td>Ability to manage emotions and emotional relationships for personal and interpersonal growth</td>
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**Table 2**

Overview of the Four-Branch Model of Emotional Intelligence, With a Focus on Its Relation to Intelligence and Personality
More recently, we have developed a new test of EI, the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT: Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2000) that attempts to improve on the psychometric qualities of the MEIS. Findings from this new scale are reported in an unpublished manuscript presently under review for this journal (Mayer et al., 2001). That manuscript, a draft of which is currently available from the authors, reports two large-sample psychometric studies. The second study concerns the MSCEIT V2.0, a 141-item ability scale that uses tasks similar to those of the MEIS to measure the four branches of EI. Like the MEIS, the MSCEIT can be scored according to a general consensus criterion. That is, if 56 of the sample says that there is a moderate amount of happiness in a face, and a participant agrees, his or her score is incremented by 56. Also as with the MEIS, we used expert scoring for the MSCEIT. Rather than use two authors as experts, however, we asked 21 members of the International Society of Research in Emotion (ISRE) to answer the MSCEIT questions. We then scored the MSCEIT according to an expert-consensus criterion on the basis of the proportion of experts from ISRE who answered each item in a particular way. As reported in our manuscript (2001), when over 2,000 participants' scores on the MSCEIT were calculated by general and expert-consensus scoring, the intercorrelation between the two sets of scores was $r = .98$. That figure is, obviously, well above the $r = .26$ figure that Roberts et al. (2001) featured in their discussion. Perhaps it is less surprising when one realizes that the convergence between general and expert-consensus scoring on the MEIS was between $r = .43$ to .78 for three of the four branches in their data set, with Brauch's 1's poor convergence ($r = .52$) bringing down the other branches to an overall convergence of $r = .48$ (p. 214). The $r = .26$ figure Roberts et al. (2001) featured in their discussion was apparently a consequence of further transformation of the data into factor scales; see p. 217.

Theoretical Concerns

The finding that general- and expert-consensus scoring effectively converge does not, by itself, solve whether there are correct answers to questions assessing EI. The finding does, however, greatly simplify the issue. If expert scoring is very close or even the same as consensus scoring, the question can now be refocused as "What does that consensus mean?" and "Is this form of determining a correct answer much different than that used in cognitive intelligence tests?"

It is worth noting at the outset that cognitive IQ tests have items that are "objectively scored," freely intermixed with tests that are scored by a (presumably expert) consensus. An objectively scored test would be something like "digins forward" on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (3rd ed.; WAIS-III; Psychological Corporation, 1997) for which participants hear a series of digits (3 3 5 2), and simply must repeat them. Other WAIS subtests, however, require some discussion to arrive at the correct answer. As the WAIS-III manual puts it, To refine the scoring criteria of those subtests for which many acceptable responses are possible (Vocabulary, Similarities, Information, and Comprehension on the WAIS-III ...), the development team conducted several scoring studies. ... Two team members independently coded each response, identified discrepancies between the code assignments, and resolved the differences so that each response had only one code. At this point, team members had to agree on the grouping of responses and the assignment of codes but not on what score value to assign a code. ... After the codes were assigned, the team evaluated the quality of the responses and assigned a score value (0, 1, or 2) to each code on the basis of the accuracy of the response." (Psychological Corporation, 1997, p. 37)

The issue then is not whether experts need to be used, but rather the nature of emotional versus cognitive information, and the nature of emotional versus cognitive experts.

Similarities and Differences Between Emotional and Cognitive Information

When thinking about general and expert consensus scoring of emotional and cognitive tasks, there seem to be three issues that come into play: (a) domain of application, (b) general consensus versus expert consensus convergence, and (c) systematization of knowledge. Differences in domain of application. Emotional and cognitive information differ in regard to their domain of application. Emotional information pertains to the human world: the relations of people (and animals) to one another, and their relation to cultural institutions, ideas, artifacts, and rules of behavior. Put another way, emotional information applies primarily to matters of how human beings and their evolution ancestors survive and interact with the immediate living world. Human beings have likely come to a general consensus about many emotional meanings.
This does not imply that there is only one way to feel or interpret feelings, but rather that it helps to know how an individual's reactions compare with how most people would emotionally respond to a situation. Such knowledge helps define the general meaning of emo-
tions in regard to relationships; for example, that hap-
piness arises in harmonious environments, fear in re-
sponse to threat, anger to goal blockage, and so on.

Cognitive information, in contrast, describes rules that have areas of application far beyond our imme-
diate living world. Although the child's mathematical world may begin, in part, with counting fingers and toes, the world of mathematics refers to a sometimes imaginary but often useful numerical world of equa-
tions, arithmetical functions, and physically possible and impossible spaces, created both for their beauty and their application. Laws that draw on mathematics to describe gravity, acceleration, and the like, apply as much to rocks, stars, and other galaxies as they do to human beings.

Differences in expertise. This difference in do-
main of application has implications for the type of expertise in each area. Whereas in the general cogni-
tive realm objects are studied, in the emotional realm, people are studied. This gives rise to the second dif-
fERENCE, what we refer to as the issue of general versus expert convergence. Given that emotional information is biosocial (i.e., biological and learned), the expert becomes the expert to some extent by studying the group consensus, and becoming, as it were, more ac-
curate about the group consensus than other individu-
als or small groups. For example, in the area of emo-
tions, experts can reliably distinguish genuine from
false, tense smiles (cf. Ekman, 1985). It is likely, however, that the general consensus can do this as well. The decisive contribution of expertise is prob-
ably to identify and distinguish between the two sorts of smiles more proficiently than the average person
can, and to elucidate how people do this naturally.

That is, the general group will be "messier" in iden-
tifying the consensus than experts would be. General
expert convergence occurs in the domain of emotions,
however, because experts look for the correct answer by paying attention to the communal information of the
group.

It is easy to come up with instances, in teaching
physics, for example, where the group consensus is simply wrong and the expert opinion is correct. In
fact, physicists refer to lay physics to represent the
timeless incorrect but consensus notions that people hold about the physical qualities and motions of
objects. A well-known example of this is the common
mon misconception (at least among young children) that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones. Here is a

case where expert knowledge plainly trumps lay
knowledge, as, since Galileo's famous experiments, it has been shown that the two sorts of objects fall at the

same rate. The difference here is that the expert in physics, for example, conducts experimental research
in areas (i.e., the behavior of objects) of which the

general person has no innate or pragmatic experience.

It is likely possible to come up with parallel in-
estances of emotional expertise as the lay physics ex-
ample. Suppose we ask "Why did Bill beat up Bob?" Because Billy (a) was unhappy about him-
self, (b) felt very good about himself, or (c) was afraid. The lay answer is likely to be "a," on the basis of the early psychological theories about bullying. More recent evidence, however, has suggested that "b" may be
the correct answer, as bullies tend to have high self-esteem (e.g., Baumeister, 1997, pp. 149-153).

Making such a claim, however, troubles emotions re-
searchers more so, we suspect, than it would physi-
cists. This is partly because discoveries in psychology are fraught with contention and have often been re-
versed as more knowledge is accumulated. This, of course, is also true of physics — after all, in the ancient
Greek period, the expert answer to the problem of
what sort of objects fell faster was that heavier objects
fell faster. In addition, however, part of the problem relates to what we would call systematization of
knowledge.

Differences in systematization and institutio-
nalization of knowledge. The third difference between in-
formation and expertise is in the emotional and
the cognitive domain is systematization and institu-
tionalization of knowledge. By systematization, we refer to authoritative dictionaries, manuals, descrip-
tions of operation, and other texts dealing with the
subject matter from a consistent viewpoint. Emotional
information has certainly been systematized to some
degree, but there is less than universal agreement as to the
systematizations. For example, one can trace vari-
est enumerations of the meanings of emotions through
philosophy, psychology, and now, artificial intelligence programs that decipher emotions in sto-
ries. Still, these authoritative manuals are not well
known, are only beginning to be taught in schools and
have not yet gained widespread cultural currency.
In short, they are not entirely culturally sanctioned.
Cultural reasons for this lag are described elsewhere
(Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000a).

There has been a higher level of systematization of certain areas of cognitive information than areas of
emotional information. Western schools, colleges, and universities focus on areas such as language, literacy, and mathematics in ways that they simply do not focus on emotions. In part for that reason, more attention has been placed on creating canonical resource materials in literary, mathematical, and similar areas. With resources such as dictionaries and textbooks, fields such as language, history, and mathematics appear more fixed, certain, and objective than does the emotions area. Imagine, for a moment, that investigators in the field of emotions were required to establish a high school curriculum for teaching about the emotions and their meanings (Cohen, 1997; 2001; Elias et al., 1997). Committees would meet, commissions would be established, and ultimately, an authoritative expert body of knowledge would be produced. Biologists, chemists, and physicists have been doing this for years, with the tacit understanding that the body of expert knowledge will change over the years but that each iteration represents a further approximation of some ultimate truth. When this begins happening in emotions, it is likely that the divergence between experts and the general consensus will be easier to describe and detect.

Do the Tests Measure EI or Emotional Conformity?

If emotional information turns out to be the general consensus, and is little different from the expert consensus, then we have, as Roberts et al. (2001) wondered, created a test of conformity? In their words, a conformity construct is of real-world relevance, but it is highly misleading to label it as an intelligence, because it relates to person-environment fit rather than to any characteristic of the individual. Indeed, in some instances it is the nonconformist who should be deemed emotionally intelligent, for example, a writer or an artist who finds a new and original way of expressing an emotion. (Roberts et al., 2001, p. 227)

Let us begin by drawing a distinction between convergent thinking and conformist or conventional thinking. Convergent thinking is the capacity to pinpoint a correct answer or answers. Conventional thinking is the limitation of one's perspective. Guilford (1959) noted that most existing intelligence tests measure convergent thinking. For example, in reading comprehension, the correct answer is getting the same point as everybody else (or as the established experts have). In this sense, our test of EI is also convergent. But that does not mean that high scorers on the MEIS are conventional, any more than high scorers on the W AIS-II are necessarily conventional. High scorers typically can reason well beyond the designated answers they provide.

Our theory of EI states that emotional reasoning begins with perceiving emotions accurately. We do not see this as much different than saying that literary analysis begins with comprehending the basic content in stories or that spatial relations begins with being able to name shapes. No one argues that such simple identification of basic linguistic meanings or basic shapes is conformity. EI continues with abstract reasoning about emotions. This includes analyzing linguistic terms relevant to emotion, and analyzing alterations in emotional sequences that are likely to occur (e.g., that delay turns frustration into anger). This is full-fledged reasoning, different perhaps, but still arguably on a par conceptually with, say, understanding the proper order of an argument. If the examples of such emotional reasoning are, perhaps, a bit more limited than those found in linguistic or spatial reasoning, it is probably in large part due to the relative paucity of systematization in the emotions area. We expect more such systematization in the future, however, as people continue to come up with new insights into the importance of the area of emotion. Even with such systematization that presently exists, we have been able to come up with enough items to write two entirely different EI tests of hundreds of items, each of which works fairly well (i.e., the MEIS and MSCERT series).

If we believe the test involves intelligence, then where does creativity enter in? Does it not depend on idiosyncratic emotional reactions? As Roberts et al. (2001) asked, should the nonconformist—a writer or an artist who finds a new and original way of expressing an emotion—be deemed emotionally intelligent? Absolutely, but note that discovering a new way of expressing an emotion doesn't necessarily involve inventing new emotional rules or having idiosyncratic emotional reactions. In music, for example, creativity may involve arranging musical tones in a new way to elicit old or new emotions and their blends. In fact, it is the very capacity of the writer or artist to portray relations among people and to describe things so as to come up with new blends of feelings or transitions among emotions, which in part marks the creative process. A composer rarely exercises creativity in writing music by playing consistently off key; a writer rarely creates deep, new feelings in a reader by failing to understand how a reader would react emotionally to the character in a similar situation. Consider Averill and Thompson-Knowles' (1991)
triad task of emotional creativity. In that task, participants were asked to create a story in which there are relationships that represent particular triads of emotions. In response to the emotions "worse, bewildered, and impulsive," one participant, who was rated quite highly on creativity, wrote the following:

The clouds are few, the sky is clear. I'm at the top of the cliff. It's real peaceful up here. Suddenly, I want to jump. I don't know why, I just want to. Calmly, I look down at where I would be unquestioned doom. It looks peaceful, warm and friendly. But why, why do I want to dive into the hands of the grim reaper? What does this mean? In haste, then motion to jump, something strange pulls me back. It is the peacefulness of the cliff. I can't destroy the peacefulness. The wind feels like velvet against my skin as I slowly shake my head. Why? (p. 280)

This passage was rated high in novelty, authenticicity, and creativity, yet what makes it work is that its anonymous author understood the meanings of emotion in a convergent sense. What was novel was the creation of a new situation to elicit the feelings.

Are the Tests Reliable?

Reliability at the Full-Scale, Branch, and Individual Task Level

The MEIS and our subsequent tests, the MSCEIT RV1.0 and V2.0, are all reliable tests at the full-scale level (where they all possess split-half reliabilities above $r = .90$). Our aforementioned manuscript (Mayer et al., 2001) reports MSCEIT V2.0 reliabilities at the branch level ranging from $r = .79$ to $.91$ using consensus scoring and $r = .77$ to $.90$ using expert scoring. The progression of tests from MEIS, studied by Roberts et al. (2001), to our newer tests, the MSCEIT RV1.1 and MSCEIT V2.0, also showed a gradual rise in reliability at the level of their individual tasks. Whereas using general consensus scoring on the 12 tasks of the MEIS yielded individual-task reliabilities ranging from $r = .49$ to $.94$ (Mayer et al., 1999), using the same scoring method for the MSCEIT V2.0 yields individual task alphas from $r = .64$ to .98 (Mayer et al., 2001 review).

Davies, Stankov, and Roberts (1998) raised concerns regarding reliability of an early 1990 ability test, which measured one aspect of EI. That test provided an empirical demonstration of the possibility of EI rather than a fully operationalized test (Mayer et al., 1990). Given our primary focus at that time, which was to demonstrate the existence of EI psychometrically, we were not too worried about the admittedly modest alpha of .63 of this rather constrained 1990 measure. To us, if EI existed, it is theoretically important, in part, because it brings a new perspective to the field's view of both emotion and intelligence. After all, almost any test's reliability can be enhanced simply by making it longer (e.g., the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula; Nunnally, 1978, pp. 210-211). That said, of course we wanted tests to be used by others in the research and applied worlds. For that reason, we worked hard to ensure that the MEIS and MSCEIT had full-scale reliabilities over .90, and we succeeded.

Roberts and his colleagues were presumably satisfied with the MEIS full-scale reliability of $r = .96$ that we reported in the 1999 article. Their focus, however, is almost exclusively, or entirely, on the reliability of the smallest components of the test, that is, individual subtests rather than on the branch scores and total test levels where reliabilities range from very good to excellent. Roberts et al. (2001) expected all the subcomponents of the test, even at the level of individual tasks, to be of uniformly high reliability. It is important to note that this has little to do with whether EI exists. Rather, it appears to be, for them, an issue of utility. Their perspective, as it is clarified in their article in this issue, appears to have been applied. They wanted to be assured that when people are tested, the scores those individuals obtain (i.e., are sold about) at the individual task level are legitimate and accurate reflections of their ability. This is an obviously legitimate concern on their part. We recognize it to be of growing importance as tests such as the MSCEIT are prepared for general use.

Reliability or Accessibility?

Given that test reliability can be improved simply by lengthening the test, why did we not heed Davies et al.'s (1998) criticisms early on and make a test longer than the MEIS that was highly reliable even at the level of the individual task? We could have taken the MEIS (or the MSCEIT tests) and added items to them to do so. Instead, we chose to shorten our tests and build up reliability at the task level through careful item selection. The reason we did so was that investigators have begun to, and will need to, correlate the test with real-life criteria. A short, efficient test that provides reliable scores at the branch and total-test level, like MSCEIT V2.0, can stimulate research and faster than a longer, more unwieldy and inefficient test can that has optimized reliability for every individual task. Through careful item selection, we have actually improved reliability at the task
level (this was accomplished in part by dropping four tasks). To adopt Roberts et al.’s (2001) perspective for a moment, it is worth comparing the present MSCEIT V.2.0 with the original WAIS (Wechsler, 1955) used until 1981. The WAIS was written after roughly 4 decades of experience with intelligence testing and replaced the earlier Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Test. The 11 WAIS sub-scale scores ranged in reliability from r = .60 to r = .86, not so different from the MSCEIT V.2.0 (Mattson, 1972, p. 239).

Ongoing Issues

There are a few issues we are not yet prepared to address in this commentary because they are empirical questions that are yet to be resolved. To many people, the most important of these issues would probably concern whether the general and expert concepts are uniform or cultural-bound in Western and non-Western societies. There are several additional issues that will chiefly be of interest to intelligence researchers. For example, why does emotional perception load most highly on factors of general EI? Here, our current work suggests that this finding may not hold up with our newer tests, and therefore we have not commented on it. Another item of chiefly psychological interest concerns whether the average intercorrelation among EI tasks is lower than that for general cognitive IQ and, if so, why? This is an interesting question for which we have no answer at this time. We address concerns about the factor structure of the area in our aforementioned manuscript now under review for this journal. Finally, we continue to believe that developmental aspects of intelligence are a defining feature of them but have not commented on that because of limitations of space.

Summary and Conclusions

In this commentary, we have restated our conceptual approach to intelligence, emotions, and emotional intelligence. Roberts et al. (2001) discussed certain concerns about our theory and measurement of EI to a large degree, those concerns centered on the low correlation between two methods of scoring the MEIS (general consensus and expert). In particular, Roberts et al.’s concerns raised the issue of whether, given the divergence of the scoring procedures, one could decide on correct answers for a test of EI. We are appreciative of the fact that Roberts, Zeidner and Matthews (2001) are engaged in this research and have raised these issues. Their work has encouraged us to present new data and to present a further consideration of the theoretical issues involved in scoring such tests. We have referred to important findings indicating that different scoring methods converge at the r = .98 level. In addition, we provided a plausible theoretical explanation of the basis on which correct answers to EI tests can be determined.

In addition, we considered some other concerns of Roberts et al. (2001), including test reliability. Although the reliability for the full MEIS is r = .96, it is lower for the 12 individual tasks. We have argued that the reliability issue raised by Roberts et al. is a limited problem and one that is addressed by our new scale, the MSCEIT V.2.0, which is now available for research.

With such an assessment tool, it is now possible to ask not only whether EI exists, but whether it is important in various realms of our lives. We expect EI to be an important predictor of significant outcomes. What research does exist suggests that EI is likely to take its place alongside other important psychological variables as a predictor of various outcomes at school, at work, etc. For example, higher EI may predict lower levels of problem behavior such as drug use and interpersonal violence (Brackett, 2001; Formica, 1998; Mayer, Parker, Caruso, & Salovey, 2001; Rubin, 1999; Salovey, Mayer, Caruso, & Lopez, in press; Trinidad & Johnson, in press).

The development and understanding of an intelligence requires a number of years of careful scrutiny and research. The most widely used cognitive scales of intelligence, the Wechsler Intelligence Scales, are the product of 60 years of research. Moreover, that research itself was initiated after an earlier 40 years of work on the clinical assessment of intelligence. If the history of the study of intelligence is any guide, there is little question that there is much still to be learned about EI. The first 10 years of EI research have been frustrating but also immensely rewarding and full of promise. We look forward to continued research in the field and to learning more about what EI predicts.

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